This paper explores the sorting patterns in a two-sided matching market where agents facing di¤erent risks match to share them. When preference belongs to the class of harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA), the risk premium is perfectly transferable within each partnership; thus a stable match minimizes the social cost of risk. In the systematic risk model, where agents are ranked by their holdings of a common risky asset, the convexity of the joint risk premium in joint risk size leads to negative assortative matching (NAM). In the idiosyncratic risk model, where agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD), NAM arises when preference exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) in the sense of Ross and riskier background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior. However, it may fail to arise when riskier background risk leads to more risk-tolerant behavior.
Introduction
When insurance and …nancial markets are incomplete, individuals often form partnerships to diversify their risks. For instance, families -mainly in developing countries -often arrange for long-distance marriages for the purpose of sharing production shocks, manufacturing employers often cushion temporary shocks on pro…t by sharing with their workers, and di¤erent parties in related businesses sometimes develop joint ventures to share resources and revenues for mutual bene…t (Townsend, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Bigsten et al, 2003) . When risk sharing is a primary concern in forming partnerships, it is legitimate to ask how the agents should match to insure against risks. Do the evidences in the marriage market or the …nancial market re ‡ect the mitigation of an incomplete insurance market, or are they boosted by other concerns at the cost of e¢ ciency in risk sharing?
In this paper, we examine the sorting patterns in a two-sided matching market where agents facing di¤erent risks match to share them. It is known that when agents have di¤erent degrees of risk aversion, negative assortative matching (NAM) arises because risk bearings are generally substitutes: a very riskaverse female is a demanding buyer for insurance and a very risk-tolerant male is a ready seller for it (Chiappori and Reny, 2006; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006) . Rather than employing di¤erent degrees of risk aversion, our paper focuses on di¤erent risks that each agent faces. Since the Pareto frontier in a given match does not have constant slope, standard type-complementarity conditions (Becker, 1973 ) cannot be used in general. However, with respect to risk-sharing problems, it is known that when preference belongs to the class of harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA), the Pareto frontier in the monetaryequivalent space is a straight line, or, in other words, the total surplus summarized by the certainty equivalent is independent of how risk sharing is performed. In this case, the matching game permits a transferable expected utility representation and the type-complementarity condition translates into minimizing social risk premium.
We then consider two applications: one where risks are perfectly correlated and one where risks are independent. In the systematic risk model, agents are ranked by their percentage of ownership of a common risky asset. Because joint risk premium is a convex function of the joint size of the common risk, it is extremely costly to pair two highly risky agents together. Hence, negative sorting is socially preferable and stable. One may wonder to what extent the result of negative sorting depends on the HARA assumption. As a robustness check, we show that, with general utility functions, NAM still arises if the supports of all risks are not too large compared with agents' risk-free incomes and/or if risk tolerance is su¢ ciently linear.
In the idiosyncratic risk model, agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). NAM arises if the preference exhibits DARA and if riskier background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior, but may fail to arise when riskier background risk leads to more risk-tolerant behavior. There are four key points to note here. First, the conditions for NAM have clear economic implications and are supported by empirical evidence. Guiso et al. (1996) concluded from Italian survey data that a consumer's perception of a riskier distribution of uninsurable 2 human-capital wealth is negatively related to the proportion of risky assets held in his/her investment portfolio. Second, the seemingly strong conditions for NAM to arise come from the fact that we are looking for the equilibrium sorting patterns for any SSD-ordered risks. For a special case of the SSD order where risks are ranked in the sense of SSD by taking the form of adding independent noise, we only need HARA and DARA to guarantee NAM. Third, when risks are large with respect to agents'risk-free incomes, an SSD deterioration in the background risk may lead to more risk-tolerant behavior, and thus, NAM may fail to arise in equilibrium. Fourth, the di¤erent results in the two applications suggest that one should investigate carefully whether agents are sharing highly correlated risks or independent risks.
The results of this paper may help us to understand the composition of risk-sharing groups in developing countries. Ghatak (1999) argued that PAM should arise because similar people will …nd it easier to monitor and enforce informal contracts. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed: on one hand, Bacon et al. (2014) found evidence that individuals were more likely to positive assortative mate on their risk attitude; and Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) also found solid evidence of positive sorting for peers with respect to physical or ethnic proximity as well as wealth or household size. On the other hand, Dercon et al. (2006) found little evidence of positive sorting in group-based funeral insurance.
Our results from the idiosyncratic model suggest that the risk-sharing e¤ect might drive matching to be negative assortative and, therefore, o¤set the monitoring and enforcing e¤ects; however, when risks are large compared with individuals'risk-free incomes, it is possible that the two e¤ects might work in the same direction and drive matching to be positive assortative.
Our work contributes to the recent literature on the risk-sharing matching game. Since the e¢ cient risk sharing rule is typically nonlinear, the risk-sharing matching game permits non-transferable utilities, and thus, standard type-complementarity conditions cannot be used. Legros and Newman (2007) noticed that the risk-sharing matching game admits a transferable utility representation when agents have logarithmic or exponential utility functions. Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) generalized their …ndings, showing that the game admits a transferable utility representation when preferences are in the harmonic absolute risk aversion class with identical shape (ISHARA). Both Legros and Newman (2007) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) proved that the equilibrium sorting pattern is negative assortative on risk preferences. Chiappori and Reny (2006) further showed that negative sorting over risk preferences is robust under general utility functions. The key di¤erence between our work and the existing literature is that our paper focuses on di¤ erent risks that each agent faces rather than di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. Among the papers on risk-sharing matching games, ours is one of the …rst to investigate sorting over agents'risk exposure. 1 There are two reasons we think examining riskiness is important. First, individual risk preferences have not proved to be stable across di¤erent stimulus domains and situations. For example, the predictive power of investors'risk taking heavily depends on whether their risk attitudes are elicited in an 1 In their recent paper, Jaramillo, Kempf and Moizeau (2013) studied the formation of risk-sharing coalitions where individuals di¤er with respect to their risky exposure. The insurance scheme considered in their work is limited to equal sharing regardless of agents' initial incomes, while in our model, there is no barrier to e¢ cient insurance within the household.
3 investment-related context (Slovic, 1964; Wehrung, 1986, 1990; Schoemaker, 1990 Schoemaker, , 1993 Weber and Milliman, 1997) . Second, because income riskiness presumably is easier to observe than attitudes toward risk, one might expect to drive testable predictions concerning the role of risk-sharing in the formation of partnerships much more easier if agents are ranked on the basis of riskiness.
Moreover, the results of our paper di¤er from those in the literature. Chiappori and Reny (2006) rigorously proved that NAM arises if agents hold the same exogenous risky assets but di¤er in their risk attitude. Following their results, Li, Sun and Chen (2013) showed that PAM may arise if agents'incomes are endogenous (also see Wang, 2013a) . Wang (2013b) showed that the presence of moral hazard may also lead to PAM. Our results show that without any other confounding factors such as endogenous income or moral hazard, the counter-intuitive PAM may arise if agents di¤er in their idiosyncratic risks instead of their risk preferences: while agents with highly risky assets always try to avoid matching with other large, perfectly-correlated risks, they might prefer to match with other large, independent risks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the risk-sharing matching game. Section 3 applies a monotonic transformation to this game and characterizes the stable match. Section 4 and 5 consider two applications, one where risks are perfectly correlated and the other where risks are independent. Section 6 extends the model to allow individuals to have di¤erent incomes and face di¤erent risks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Risk-Sharing Matching Game
Consider a one-to-one matching market with two lines of agents. We denote them as N males fi = 1; :::; N g and N females fj = 1; :::; N g. Each agent is endowed with an exogenous risky income, denoted byw i for male i andw j for female j. All agents are expected-utility maximizers with respect to the homogeneous probabilistic belief, and identically risk-averse with vNM utility function u(c), which is bounded and continuously di¤erentiable in consumption c, with u 0 (c) > 0 and u 00 (c) < 0.
Agents match in order to share risks. At period 0, each agent voluntarily matches with a mate from the opposite side. Each partnership (i; j) will commit to rules for sharing their joint income, which depends on the state of the world. At period 1, the value of all shocks are realized, and agents consume according to the prior sharing rules. We rule out any search or coordination frictions, and there is no limited commitment or asymmetric information. Denotez ij w i +w j as the joint income received by the matched pair (i; j): Division (z ij c ij ; c ij ), which is associated with partnership (i; j) prior to the realization of shocks, speci…es individual consumptions to i and j under each realization ofz ij . Under this agreement, i's expected utility is Eu(z ij c ij (z ij )) and j's is Eu(c ij (z ij )):
Assume that risk is shared within each partnership in a Pareto-e¢ cient way, a situation in which no agent's expected utility can be strictly increased without decreasing his/her partner's. A risk-sharing rule c ij ( ) is a deterministic function that maps each realized value ofz ij to an individual consumption level for j. Given the random joint incomez ij associated with partnership (i; j), a risk-sharing rule c ij ( ) is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists a scalar 2 R ++ such that c ij ( ) solves the following maximization problem:
The set of Pareto optimal risk-sharing rules is called Pareto e¢ cient frontier.
De…nition 1 A matching correspondence is an assignment of males to females. A stable match speci…es a matching correspondence and the associated risk-sharing rules for each partnership, which is immune to coalitional deviations. That is, there does not exist a risk-sharing rule under which a male and a female, who are not matched to one another, prefer each other to their current assignments.
Assume that incomes strictly di¤er within each side of the population; further assume that the marginal utility of consumption is bounded at autarky. The existence of stable matches has been established by Legros and Newman (2007) . Then there is a one-to-one matching of i to j. Under a positive/negative assortative matching (PAM/NAM), the most risky male is matched with the most/least risky female, the second-most risky male is matched with the second-most/least risky female, and so on. The formal de…nition of the equilibrium matching pattern is stated as follows:
De…nition 2 A stable match is positive (negative) assortative if and only if for any i; i 0 ; j and j 0 , such that i and i 0 are matched with j and j 0 respectively, we have i 0 i () j 0 ( )j:
Stable Match and Social Risk Premium
Becker's (1973) seminal paper provided a foundation for analyzing the competitive assignments of partners with transferable utility. But in our risk-sharing matching game, the Pareto e¢ cient frontier in the utility space within a given partnership does not necessarily have a constant slope, and thus standard type-complementarity conditions cannot OKbe used in general. However, a simpler case arises when it is possible to apply a monotonic transformation to the expected utility levels such that the transformed Pareto e¢ cient frontier has a constant slope. In this case, the matching game permits a transferable expected utility representation as de…ned below:
The risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation if for any random joint incomez ij , there exists a constant C ij such that u 1 [Eu(c ij (z ij ))] + u 1 [Eu(z ij c ij (z ij ))] = C ij for all Pareto optimal risk sharing rules c ij ( ).
A central implication of the above de…nition is that, if the risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation, the joint output, C ij , in terms of the certainty equivalent, depends only on the characteristics of the members'joint income distributionz ij . This output measure allows agents to compare gains from potential partnerships they may acquire. In other words, C ij can be treated as the joint monetary output associated with partnership (i; j). Similar to Becker (1973) , the condition for a stable match is to maximize the social output P i;j C ij , which is the sum of the outputs over all partnerships for a given matching correspondence. Denote the Joint Risk Premium as ij = Ez ij C ij , and the associated Social Risk Premium as P i;j ij , that is, the sum of the joint risk premium over all partnerships for a given matching correspondence. Then, the maximization of the social output will be equivalent to the minimization the social risk premium.
The existence of transferable expected utility representation is subject to certain regularity conditions. With respect to risk-sharing problems, it is known that when preference belongs to the HARA class, the Pareto frontier in the monetary-equivalent space is a straight line, or, in other words, the total surplus summarized by the certainty equivalent is independent of the way risk sharing is performed (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006) . The results for HARA preference can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation . 2 Proof. The proof can be found in Mazzocco's (2004) and Schulhofer-Wohl's (2006) studies.
Because all agents have identical utility function, the solution to (1) when
That is, sharing the joint income equally is one of the Pareto optimal risk-sharing rules. According to 2 Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) showed that the risk-sharing matching games admit a transferable expected utility representation if and only if preferences are in the class of identical shape harmonic absolute risk aversion (ISHARA). In other words, agents can have di¤erent utility functions, but the slope of their risk tolerance must be the same:
This is equivalent to saying that all agents have the same HARA utility function, but with di¤erent initial wealth. We discuss the case in which agents di¤er in both initial wealth and riskiness of their assets in Section 6.
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De…nition 3, if the risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation, the joint output C ij , which is associated with partnership (i; j), does not depend on the risk-sharing rules.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can derive C ij by applying the particular risk-sharing rule c ij (z ij ) = zij 2 , which gives that
Hence, v( ) can be interpreted as the utility function of a representative agent for any matched pair (i; j). The joint output C ij and the joint risk premium ij = Ez ij C ij are simply the certainty equivalent and risk premium of the representative agent, respectively. Finally, using the de…nition of v( ) and condition (2), one can quickly con…rm that preference u( ) belongs to the HARA class if and only if v( ) also belongs to the same class.
The results for the HARA preferences immediately follow:
Lemma 2 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and if the joint risk premium ij is sub(super)modular in (i; j), then any stable matching of the risk-sharing matching game will be positive (negative) assortative on the partners' income riskiness.
Proof. See Appendix.
Sorting over Systematic Risk
In this section, we consider the application in which risks are perfectly correlated. Agents are ranked by their holdings of a common risky asset. That is, male i's income isw i = w 0 + k ix and female j's income
andz ij = 2w 0 + k ijx , we have ij as a function of k ij and w 0 : ij = (k ij ; w 0 ). As a result of market competition, stable match guarantees the minimization of the social cost of risk. According to Lemma 2, stable match will be positive (negative) assortative on risk sizes (k i ; k j ) if
i.e., the joint risk premium is concave (convex) in the size of the joint risk exposure. As suggested by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2001) , multiplicative risk is self-aggravating in the sense that the cost curve of risk (k ij ; w 0 ) is convex in the unit holdings of such risk k ij . Here, if the joint risk premium is a convex function of the joint size of the common risk, it is extremely costly to pair two highly risky agents together, and thus NAM is socially preferable and stable. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the joint risk premium is convex in the size of joint risk exposure and, therefore, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game is negative assortative over the riskiness of the agents' income.
Therefore,
Solving for v (c) from (2) and substituting into (3), we …nd that there will be NAM i¤
which holds as a direct application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
One may wonder to what extent the result of negative sorting depends on the HARA assumption.
Notice that the result of Proposition 1 immediately follows from the fact that the risk premium is convex in the risk size. Without the HARA assumption, Eeckhoubt and Gollier (2001) show that the risk premium may not be convex in the size of risk and thus, Proposition 1 may fail. However, as a robustness check, we are able to show that with general utility functions, NAM still arises if the supports of all risks are not too large compared with the agents'risk-free incomes and/or if the risk tolerance is su¢ ciently linear. 3 In their paper, Chiappori and Reny (2006) show that competitive forces will lead risk-sharing groups to be composed of individuals who are rather di¤erent in their risk preferences. Here, consistent with their result, we show that it will lead risk-sharing groups to consist of agents with rather di¤erent risk sizes. There are two reasons we believe riskiness is an important factor to explore. First, in practice, individual risk preferences have not proven to be stable across di¤erent stimulus domains and situations.
This creates a di¢ culty in assessing agents' risk attitudes because di¤erent methods and procedures often result in di¤erent classi…cations. Second, because risk sizes are much easier to track down, one may expect to drive testable predictions much more easily.
In the next section, which concerns the two factors that determine agents'risk-taking behavior, i.e., agents'risk preferences and risk exposures, we will show that there is a fundamental di¤erence in their e¤ects: while a highly risk-averse agent always prefers to match with a less risk-averse agent for better insurance, an agent with a very risky asset may prefer to match with another agent with a very risky asset for the purpose of risk sharing. 3 With general preferences, the utility (under any monotone transformation) is not fully transferable between partners.
In this case, Legros and Newman (2007) presented su¢ cient conditions for monotone matching. Applying their "generalized di¤erence conditions", we are able to show that NAM still arises under fairly reasonable assumptions:The proof can be found in the Appendix. 8 
Sorting over Idiosyncratic Risks
In this section, we consider the application when risks are idiosyncratic. Agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). That is, male i's income
Thus, in this case, we have ij as a function of the joint risk" m i +" f j and the initial wage w 0 : ij = " m i +" f j ; w 0 . Before proceeding, we show through examples that sorting in either direction is possible without further restrictions other than HARA preference.
Preliminary Examples
Example 1 (CARA utility). Suppose there are two males m 1 and m 2 endowed with w 0 +" m i , i = 1, 2 and two females f 1 and f 2 endowed with w 0 +" f j , j = 1, 2, where" m i and" f j are independent. Because all agents have identical CARA utilities, given the initial wage level w 0 , ij is additive over (" m i ;" f j ):
Therefore, ij is both (but not strictly) supermodular and submodular in (i; j), which leads to arbitrary matching.
Example 2 (IARA utility). Suppose instead that all agents have quadratic utility u(c) = c c 2 2 . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that m 1 and f 1 are endowed with certain income w 0 , and that m 2 and f 2 are endowed with risky incomes w 0 +" m and w 0 +" f , respectively, where" m and" f are independently distributed with zero mean and variance 2 m and 2 f , respectively. Notice that for quadratic utility, the mean-variance approach is exact. We have joint risk premium ij = w 0 (1 p (1 w 0 ) 2 + V ar(z ij )).
We can easily show that, for any given initial wage w 0 , ij is concave in V ar(z ij ), which implies that PAM is stable. The key insights from these examples are that all sorting patterns are possible with idiosyncratic risks and that DARA may be necessary for NAM to arise.
General Results
In order to …nd general results, we can simply look at the 2 2 case in which two males are matched with two females 4 . Via Lemma 2, NAM is stable if the following supermodular condition holds:
Thus, condition (4) holds if the joint risk premium is "convex" in the riskiness of idiosyncratic risks. 5 The …rst lemma in this section is given as follows.
Lemma 3 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the joint risk premium (x; w 0 ) is convex in w 0 .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
One implication of Lemma 3 is that if the agents all face the same risks but di¤er in their initial wealth levels, NAM will arise.
Before proceeding to the general conditions for negative or positive sorting, we introduce the following de…nition:
De…nition 5 A utility function u 1 is more risk-averse than another utility function u 2 in the sense of Ross if there exist a positive constant and a di¤ erentiable function g with g 0 0 and g 00 0 such that u 1 = u 2 + g:
Risk aversion in the sense of Ross is a stronger concept than risk aversion in the sense of Pratt. It is easy to verify that u 00
always holds in this case. To help in further understanding the concept of "risk aversion in the sense of Ross", we denote i (" 2 !" 1 ; w) as the price that agent i is ready to pay to replace lottery" 2 with lottery" 1 at wealth level w, i.e., 4 The reason for discussing only the 2 2 case is merely for expositional purposes. If there is a complete order of agents' risks, i.e., " m : : " f N , then our conditions for NAM/PAM can immediately apply in the case in which there are equal numbers of males and females, as well as in the case of the matched agents when there are unequal numbers of males and females, although in the latter case, the identities of the agents who are left unmatched depend on the distribution of the population. 5 Suppose f is a convex function with one variable. Then for any
Ross (1981) showed that agent u 1 is more risk-averse than agent u 2 in the sense of Ross if and only if agent u 1 is ready to pay more than agent u 2 for any SSD reduction in risk (i.e., 1 (" 2 !" 1 ; w) 2 (" 2 !" 1 ; w) ; 8w," 2 and" 1 , with" 2 SSD -" 1 ).
De…nition 6 A utility function u exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross if (" 2 !" 1 ; w 1 ) (" 2 !" 1 ; w 2 ) ; 8w 1 ,w 2 ," 2 and" 1 , with" 2
SSD
-" 1 and w 1 w 2 .
De…nition 7 A utility function u satis…es the property that any SSD deterioration in the background risk increasing risk aversion in the sense of Ross if for any" 2
-" 1 , U 2 is more risk-averse than U 1 in the sense of Ross, where U i (x) Eu(x +" i ), for i = 1; 2:
The above notation and results allow us to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross and any SSD deterioration in the background risk increases risk aversion in the sense of Ross, then the risk-sharing matching game will be negative assortative on agents' income riskiness.
Proof. De…ne (" 2 !" 1 ; w) as the price that agent v is ready to pay to replace lottery" 2 with lotterỹ " 1 at wealth level w. From the concept of risk premium and the de…nition of (" 2 !" 1 ; w), we have v (w 0 (" 2 ; w 0 )) = Ev (w 0 +" 2 )
= Ev (w 0 (" 2 !" 1 ; w 0 ) +" 1 )
= v (w 0 (" 2 !" 1 ; w 0 ) (" 1 ; w 0 (" 2 !" 1 ; w 0 ))) from which we obtain
The two sides of the above equation represent two equivalent ways of eliminating risk" 2 . One is to eliminate" 2 once and for all, and agent v is willing to pay (" 2 ; w 0 ) for this. The other is to eliminate" 2 step by step, …rst replacing" 2 with a smaller risk" 1 at the price of (" 2 !" 1 ; w 0 ) and then eliminating " 1 at the price of (" 1 ; w 0 (" 2 !" 1 ; w 0 )).
A stable match is NAM if
Applying (6), we can rewrite the above inequality as h
where
Consider agent 1 with utility function V 1 (x) = Ev(x +" f 1 ) and agent 2 with V 2 (x) = Ev(x +" f 2 ). As in Gollier (2001) , we de…ne the risk premium 1 (" m 2 !" m 1 ) as the price that agent 1 is willing to pay to replace" m 2 with" m 1 ; and we de…ne 2 (" m 2 !" m 1 ) as the counterpart for agent 2. Then
holds i¤ V 2 is more risk averse than V 1 in the sense of Ross, i.e., an SSD deterioration in the background risk makes the agents more risk averse in the sense of Ross.
which, by applying (6), can be rewritten as
. Thus, we only need to show:
To prove (11), we …rst show that
Using the expressions to substitute for w 0 ; w 2 ; w 3 and w 4 , (12) can be rewritten as
. Moreover, the fact that the utility is DARA in the sense of Ross and w 0 > w 1 implies that ("
. Hence, the above inequality and therefore (12) hold. Now, inequality (11) follows by noticing that (i) is decreasing and convex in w 0 ; (ii) w 0 > max(w 2 ; w 3 ) > min (w 2 ; w 3 ) > w 4 ; and (iii) inequality (12) holds.
Proposition 2 provides a su¢ cient condition for NAM: if the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross and a higher background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior, then negative sorting is stable. Thus, in facing risks from the male side, female 2 (taking" f 2 as her background risk) behaves in a more risk-averse way than female 1 (taking" f 1 as her background risk). Therefore, in order to match with the less risky male 1, female 2 is ready to o¤er male 1 a higher premium over male 2 than female 1 is. Similarly, in order to match with the less risky female 1, male 2 is ready to o¤er female 1 a higher premium over female 2 than male 1 is. Hence, negative sorting is stable.
One may wonder how restrictive the condition is in Proposition 2. On the theoretical front, Gollier (2001) 6 proved that u 1 is more risk averse than u 2 in the sense of Ross if and only if there exists a scalar such that:
:
Applying the above condition, one can easily show that u exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross if there exists a scalar , such that
where p (w) = u 000 (w) u 00 (w) denotes the measure of absolute prudence and r (w) = u 00 (w) u 0 (w) denotes the measure of absolute risk aversion.
Under our HARA assumption regarding preference, the utility function can be written as u (c) = 
When the range of the relevant wealth is not too large, the utility exhibits DARA in the sense of
Ross.
Now, we derive the conditions under which any SSD deterioration in the background risk increases risk aversion in the sense of Ross. Consider agent 1 with utility function V 1 (x) = Ev(x +" f 1 ) and agent 2 with V 2 (x) = Ev(x +" f 2 ). The condition of Proposition 2 requires that V 1 be more risk averse than V 2 in the sense of Ross. That is, there exists a scalar such that , Ev 00 (w 1 +" 2 ) Ev 00 (w 1 +" 1 ) Ev 0 (w 2 +" 2 ) Ev 0 (w 2 +" 1 )
; 8w 1 ; w 2 :
For small risk" i , we have: Ev 00 (w +" i ) v 00 (w) + 
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Substituting into the condition (15), we have:
Or equivalently:
where t (w) = u 0000 (w) u 000 (w) denotes the measure of absolute temperance, p (w) = u 000 (w) u 00 (w) denotes the measure of absolute prudence, and r (w) = u 00 (w) u 0 (w) denotes the measure of absolute risk aversion. Under our speci…cation for the utility function, (16) becomes:
which holds if the support of income realizations is su¢ ciently narrow. In general, for large risks, deriving the conditions for equation (15) is quite complicated and we leave it for future work.
Although the conditions in Proposition 2 impose strict restrictions on preference, as well as risk size, the economic implications are clear and supported by the empirical evidence. Guiso et al. (1996) concluded from Italian survey data that a consumer's perception of a riskier distribution of uninsurable human-capital wealth is negatively related to the proportion of risky assets held in his/her investment portfolio. It is also worthwhile to point out that the seemingly strong conditions for NAM come from the fact that we are looking for sorting patterns for any SSD ordered risks. In this sense, the conditions for PAM could be equally if not more restrictive. In the next subsection, we will show that HARA and DARA are su¢ cient to guarantee NAM if risks are ranked in the sense of SSD taking the form of adding independent noise.
SSD Risks with Independent Noise
To see a less restrictive condition for monotone sorting, we consider a special case in which" m 2 is an increase in risk of" m 1 in the sense of SSD taking the form of adding independent noise" m , and similarly for" f 2 and" f 1 : That is, assume male 1 and female 1 are endowed withw m 1 = w 0 +" m 1 and w f 1 = w 0 +" f 1 , respectively; and assume male 2 and female 2 are endowed withw m 2 = w 0 +" m 1 +" m and w f 2 = w 0 +" f 1 +" f , respectively. All idiosyncratic risks and noises are independently distributed with E" m = E" f = 0. Here, in order to characterize the equilibrium sorting pattern, we need to compare
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium sorting pattern:
Proposition 3 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA, and agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of SSD taking the form of adding independent noise, then the risk-sharing matching game will be negative assortative on the agents' income riskiness.
The concept of risk vulnerability is important in understanding the results of negative sorting. In their seminal paper, Gollier and Pratt (1996) introduced the concept of risk vulnerability as a basic tool for examining the e¤ect of an unfair background risk on an agent's attitude towards other independent risks. In particular, utility is risk vulnerable if and only if the introduction of an unfair risk increases the risk premium of every independent risk. 7 Gollier and Pratt (1996) 
An Example of PAM under HARA and DARA
The following example helps us to understand, in general, why we need restrictions beyond HARA and DARA for NAM to arise. In particular, if SSD ordered risks do not take the form of adding independent noise, NAM may fail to arise, even when the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA.
Example 4 Consider the utility function v (c) = p c, and assume w 0 = 0," f 1 = (0; 1 2 ; 1; 1 2 ) 9 ," m 1 = (0; 1 2 ; x; 1 2 )," f 2 = (0; 1 2 ; 0:5; 1 4 ; 1:5; 1 4 )," m 2 = (0; 1 2 ; x 2 ; 1 4 ; 3x 2 ; 1 4 ), where x > 0." f 2 is SSD-dominated by" f 1 by introducing a zero-mean risk to " f 1 = 1;" m 2 is SSD-dominated by" m 1 by introducing a zero-mean risk to " m 1 = x. Recall that C ij = v 1 Ev (z ij ). After careful calculation, we obtain C 11 , C 12 , C 21 , and C 22 as functions of x. 10 x, such that f (x) < 0 for x < 7 The mathematical de…nition of risk vulnerability is as follows. De…ne the generalized risk premium " (x; w) of risk
x in the presence of initial wealth w and background risk" as the price that an agent with utility function u would be willing to pay to avoid riskx at an uncertain position w +": Eu(w +" +x) = Eu(w +" "(x; w)). De…ne (x; w) as the standard risk premium of riskx, which is determined by the following equation: Eu(w +x) = Eu(w +" (x; w)). We say that u is risk vulnerable if and only if " (x; w) (x; w) for all w and unfair" (E" 0). 8 See Gollier and Pratt (1996) Corollary 1, page 117. 9 This formula means that Pr(" f 1 = 0) = Pr(" f 1 = 1) = 1 2 . Similar explanations apply to other random variables. x and f (x) > 0 for x > b
x. This suggests that NAM is more likely to arise if the support of risks is su¢ ciently narrow, while PAM may arise if the support of risks is su¢ ciently large.
In this example, we show that for large risks ( x being su¢ ciently large), HARA and DARA are not su¢ cient to guarantee NAM. The key point to note here is that an SSD deterioration in the background risk may reduce an agent's degree of risk aversion. De…ne r j (w) = Ev 00 (w+" f j ) Ev 0 (w+" f j )
as the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of risk aversion for an agent with utility function v in the presence of background risk" f j . It can be shown that, there exists a threshold valueŵ, such that r 1 (w) > r 2 (w) for w <ŵ and r 1 (w) < r 2 (w) for w >ŵ 11 . This suggests that the agent is more locally risk averse at w <ŵ in the presence of background risk" f 1 than in the presence of background risk" f 2 . So, in facing risks from the male side, female 1 (taking" f 1 as her background risk) may behave in a more risk-averse way than female 2 (taking" f 2 as her background risk) 12 . Therefore, in order to be matched with the less risky male 1, female 1 may be willing to o¤er male 1 a higher premium over male 2 than female 2 is. Similarly, in order to match with the less risky female 1, male 1 may be willing to o¤er female 1 a higher premium over female 2 than male 2 is. As a result, PAM may arise in equilibrium.
In their paper, Chiappori and Reny (2006) showed that NAM always arises if agents di¤er only in their risk attitude. Following their results, Li, Sun, and Chen (2013) showed that PAM may arise if agents can make an e¤ort to reduce their income riskiness. Wang (2013b) showed that the presence of moral hazard may also lead to PAM. Here, without any other confounding factor such as endogenous income or moral hazard, counter intuitive PAM may arise if agents di¤er in terms of their idiosyncratic risks: while agents with highly risky assets always attempt to avoid being matched with other large perfectly correlated risks, they may prefer to be matched with other large independent risks. This result helps us to understand the composition of risk-sharing groups in developing countries. Ghatak (1999) argued that PAM should arise because similar people will …nd it easier to monitor and enforce informal contracts. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed: on one hand, Bacon et al. (2014) found evidence that individuals were more likely to positive assortative mate on their risk attitude; and Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) also found solid evidence of positive sorting for peers with respect to physical or ethnic proximity as well as wealth or household size. On the other hand, Dercon et al. (2006) found little evidence of positive sorting in group-based funeral insurance. Our results suggest that, the risk-sharing e¤ect may drive matching to be negative assortative and therefore o¤set the monitoring and enforcing e¤ects; however, when risks are large compared with individuals' risk-free incomes, it is possible that the two e¤ects may work in the same direction and drive matching to be positive assortative. . 1 2 Notice that female 1 is not uniformly more risk averse than female 2. Indeed, she is locally more risk averse than female 2 for w <ŵ but less risk averse than female 2 for w >ŵ. Therefore, there is no uniform prediction for the two agents' risk-taking behavior. Depending on the properties of the risk taken, female 1 may or may not behave in a more risk-averse way than female 2.
6 Extension: Multidimensional Matching
In general, individuals have di¤erent incomes and face di¤erent risks. When agents'types are multidimensional, there is not a complete order of types. We therefore only consider two cases with complete order, that is, the order of agents'riskiness goes in exactly the same or exactly the opposite direction as their risk-free incomes. We have shown via Lemma 3 that if agents all face the same risks but di¤er in their risk-free incomes, NAM will arise. We have also shown via Propositions 1 and 2 that if agents all have the same risk-free income but di¤er in the risks they face, NAM will arise under certain restrictions. Thus, if types are two dimensional, a natural guess would be that NAM will arise based on riskiness because higher risk-free incomes seem to go in the same direction as higher riskiness for DARA utilities. We now proceed to show that in fact, both NAM and PAM can arise in this case.
The Case of Systematic Risk
We …rst study a multidimensional matching game in which risks are perfectly correlated. Agents are characterized by a pair (w i ; k i ). Here we only consider two cases with complete order: (i) agents with lower risk-free incomes hold larger shares of the common asset, i.e., k i < k i+1 and w i > w i+1 , k j < k j+1 and w j > w j+1 and (ii) agents with higher risk-free incomes hold larger shares of the common asset, i.e., k i < k i+1 and w i < w i+1 , k j < k j+1 and w j < w j+1 .
In the …rst case, consider male i, i 0 and female j, j 0 , with i < i 0 , and j < j 0 . Remember that NAM arises if
where ij = Ez ij v 1 [Ev(w ij +k ijx )] is the joint risk premium for (i; j); w ij = w i +w j and k ij = k i +k j .
Notice that ij can be written as a function of w ij and k ij : ij (w ij ; k ij ). To simplify, we drop the subscript "ij" and write the function of joint risk premium as (w; k) = Ez v 1 [Ev(w + kx)], whose properties are listed below:
The …rst inequality is actually Proposition 1. The second inequality implies that if the agents all hold the same amount of the common asset, there will be NAM on the risk-free income. Higher income leads to higher tolerance for risk under DARA; thus if we take risk-free income as a proxy for agents' degree of risk aversion, then Lemma 4 coincides with Chiappori and Reny's (2006) argument that stable match is negative assortative on agents'risk attitude. The following lemma is also useful:
Lemma 5 Let f (x; y) be twice continuously di¤ erentiable in the domain [0; 1) [0; 1), with f 11 0, f 22 0 and f 12 0, where f 11 = @ 2 f @x 2 f 22 = @ 2 f @y 2 and f 12 = @ 2 f @x@y . Then for any 0 x 1 min (x 2 ; x 3 ) max (x 2 ; x 3 ) x 4 , and y 1 maxfy 2 ; y 3 g minfy 2 ; y 3 g y 4 0, such that
we must have
The two lemmata immediately yield the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the preference belongs to HARA class and exhibits DARA, and agents with lower risk-free incomes hold larger sizes of common risky assets, then NAM is stable. 
where k i is the size of the risk held by agent i and a is a constant number. In this example, all agents' risk-free income and size of risks pairs (w i ; k i )s lie on the same line. De…neỹ = a +x. Then, agent i's income can be written as w i + k ix = w 0 + k iỹ . This speci…cation brings us back to the case in which all agents have the same risk-free income w 0 and hold di¤erent amounts of a common assetỹ. Thus, NAM is stable. (b) The PAM example. Consider a 2 2 case in which the utility function belonging to the HARA class takes the following form: v (w) = ln w. Assume the common riskx is a small risk with zero mean and variance 2 . Applying Arrow-Pratt approximation, we have (w; k) It can be shown that there exists a threshold b 
The Case of Idiosyncratic Risks
We now study a multidimensional matching game in which the risks are independent. Suppose agent x > 10. The example illustrates that PAM is likely to arise in equilibrium if agents who have higher risk-free income face risks that are su¢ ciently large (x is su¢ ciently large).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the sorting patterns in a two-sided matching market where agents facing di¤erent risks match to share them. We show that the competitive sorting pattern crucially depends on the interaction between risks. While negative sorting almost always arises when risks are perfectly correlated, the counter-intuitive positive sorting may arise when risks are independent. In the case where risks are independent, negative sorting tends to arise if a riskier background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior. Our …ndings enrich the literature on assortative matching, and to the best of our knowledge, are among the …rst attempts to investigate sorting over agents'risk exposure. Our results help in understanding the composition of risk-sharing groups in developing countries. Behind the mixed empirical evidence of sorting patterns, there might be a trade-o¤ between the risk-sharing e¤ect and the monitoring and enforcing e¤ects.
The present research can be extended along several lines. Firstly, in many instances, the riskiness of income is not entirely exogenous but partially a choice variable. In the developed world, individuals usually choose their professions and investments as a function of their risk preferences and their abilities.
There could then be a trade-o¤ between competing for the most suitable partner for the purpose of risk sharing and for the motive of risk control. Li, Sun and Chen (2013) and Wang (2013a) studied endogenous risks and showed that PAM may arise in equilibrium. However, they only considered the case where preferences belong to the CARA class and incomes were subjected to normal distributions.
It is therefore worthwhile to explore more general cases. Secondly, an interesting extension would permit agents to renegotiate sharing rules posterior to matching. Li, Sun, and Wang (2015) introduced a bargaining stage and showed that PAM may arise in equilibrium. Thirdly, the e¤ect of risk factors on matching e¢ ciency is also relevant for …nancial securities 14 or joint venture agreements. Our model indicates that it is costly to pair two highly risky assets together, which is associated with a high social cost of risk that the investors have to pay. The recent trend of overconcentration of risks in the subordinated debts raises our concern that, for the issuers, the main purpose of securitization is not to share risks with investors, but to keep the risk concentrated so that they can achieve as much leveraging as possible (Acharya and Richardson, 2010) . Further studies are needed in the context of …nancial securities and institutions.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, recall that ij being supermodular is equivalent to C ij being submodular. Then we prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose C ij is submodular and NAM does not arise. This means that there exist i < i 0 and j < j 0 , such that, in equilibrium, male i is matched with j and male i 0 is matched with female j 0 . Denote the equilibrium certainty equivalent of the four agents by C i , C j , C i 0 and C j 0 respectively. We have C i + C j = C ij and C i 0 + C j 0 = C i 0 j 0 . Because C ij is submodular, we must have C i 0 j + C ij 0 > C ij + C i 0 j 0 , which implies that either C i 0 j > C i 0 + C j or C ij 0 > C i + C j 0 holds but not both (which contradicts the fact that C i 0 j + C ij 0 > C ij + C i 0 j 0 ). If C i 0 j > C i 0 + C j , then i and j 0 are both better o¤ if they deviate and are matched together; if C ij 0 > C i + C j 0 , then i 0 and j are both better o¤ if they deviate and are matched together. This contradicts our assumption that the matching is stable.
Similarly, one can prove that PAM arises if ij is submodular.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The following de…nition is useful for the proof of this proposition:
De…nition 8 (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) The generalized risk premium " (x; w) of riskx in the presence of initial wealth w and background risk", is the price that the representative agent would be willing to pay to avoid the riskx at an uncertain position w +": Ev(w +" +x) = Ev(w +" " (x; w)), wherex and" are independent. Gollier (2001) 15 proved that risk aversion in the sense of Ross is a su¢ cient condition for the comparative risk aversion to be preserved in the presence of a background risk. That is, if agent u 1 is more risk-averse than agent u 2 in the sense of Ross, then agent u 1 behaves in a more risk-averse way than agent u 2 in the presence of background risk. In technical terms, this means that if u 1 = u 2 + g,
is the generalized risk premium of agent u i . We derive a useful equivalence for the generalized risk premium. For risksx,ỹ andz, by the above de…nition, we have
Ev(w x (ỹ +z; w) +x) = Ev(w +x +ỹ +z) = Ev(w x+ỹ (z; w) +x +ỹ) = Ev(w x+ỹ (z; w) x (ỹ; w x+ỹ (z; w)) +x) from which it follows that
In particular, whenx = 0, the above equation is written as
Proposition 1 with General Preference
Consider the 2 2 case in which there are two males m 1 , m 2 and two females f 1 , f 2 : De…ne (m i ; f j )'s joint risk exposure as k ij , k i + k j . We normalize k 11 = 1, and thus k 12 > 1, k 21 > 1 and k 22 = k 12 + k 21 1.
Thus, (m i ; f j )'s joint income isz ij = 2w 0 + k ijx . Using V (k ij ; u), we can de…ne the indirect utility function of the maximization problem as follows:
and we have
where = (k ij ; u) > 0 is a function of the joint size of risk, k ij , and the minimum expected utility level guaranteed for female u. V (k ij ; u) represents the maximum payo¤ m i can get given f j 's payo¤ being no less than u. The …rst-order conditions require perfectly correlated marginal utilities for the matched agents:
under the following constraint:
Denote the solution to (35) and (36) as c ij = c (z ij ; u) = c(x; k ij ; u) 16 and ij = (k ij ; u). For the NTU matching game, Legros and Newman (2007) have established the "generalized di¤erence condition"for monotone sorting. Applying their condition, we have the following lemma:
Lemma A1 For the arbitrary distribution of risk sizes, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game is negative assortative on agents'levels of systematic risk exposure if for 8k 12 , k 21 > 1 and 8u,
The proof can be found in Legros and Newman (2007) . The term V (1; u) represents the maximum expected utility for m 1 given that f 1 receives u: Keeping m 1 's payo¤ at the same level but matching him with f 2 would generate expected utility V (k 12 ; V (1; u)) for f 2 : Thus, the LHS of (37) represents m 1 's willingness to pay (in expected utility terms) to be matched with f 2 instead of f 1 given that f 1 receives u, and the RHS is the counterpart for m 2 . Hence, in competing for f 2 rather than f 1 , m 1 can always outbid male m 2 and still leave more (compared to being matched with f 1 ) for himself. Before proceeding, the following lemma provides a condition equivalent to (37). 1 6 The last equality is due to the fact that z ij is a function of k ij and x: z ij = 2w 0 + k ij x.
Lemma A2 For the arbitrary distribution of risk sizes, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game is negative assortative on agents' sizes of systematic risk exposure if for 8k 12 , k 21 > 1 and 8u,
where c i1 = c(x; k i1 ; u) and c i2 = c(x; k i2 ; u) are solutions to (35) and (36).
Proof. We …rst prove that
De…ne (k 21 ) , V (k 12 + k 21 1; V (k 21 ; u)). From Lemma A1, a su¢ cient condition for NAM is that:
for 8k 12 , k 21 > 1 and 8u, 0 (k 21 ) = V 1 (k 22 ; V (k 21 ; u)) + V 2 (k 22 ; V (k 21 ; u)) V 1 (k 21 ; u) 0
where V l () denotes the partial derivative of V w.r.t. the l-th argument, and k 22 = k 12 + k 21 for 8k 12 , k 21 > 1 and 8u. Because the choice of u is arbitrary, so is b u. The above inequality is equivalent to (39). Also, because (39) holds for any k 21 < k 22 , (38) holds via the same logic.
The intuition behind (38) is clear. A female who receives an expected utility level of u valuates the market stockx by employing her marginal utility as a shadow price, which re ‡ects the maximum price (in expected utility terms) she is willing to pay for an extra unit of joint risk exposure. Thus, the bene…t of a less risky agent being matched to a highly risky partner must exceed the bene…ts conferred on a riskier agent for NAM to arise. In other words, (39) states that in competing for m 2 ; which will result in higher joint risk exposure as compared to with m 1 , f 1 can always outbid f 2 as a consequence of the higher valuation of extra risk exposure.
One can go even further. For example, for IARA utility function, the concavity of the risk tolerance is su¢ cient to guarantee NAM without imposing any restrictions on the support of the risks. 18 Also, for DARA and concave risk tolerance, which is commonly assumed in the literature when explaining the risk premium puzzle (see Gollier, 2001) , one can derive a su¢ cient condition that provides the exact restriction on the upper bound as follows:
Proposition A3 If preference exhibits DARA and the risk tolerance is concave, then NAM arises if
Proof. We must prove that both T (c(x)) 2w 0 is decreasing in " and thus approaches in…nity as " goes to zero. This suggests that the more linear risk tolerance is, the fewer restrictions we need to impose on the risk supports for NAM to arise. 1 8 For x < 0, T 0 (c) x (T i + T j ) T 0 (z) x (T (c) + T (z c)) T 0 (z) x (T (0) + T (z)) (T (0) + T (2w 0 )) < 0 where the …rst two inequalities are due to the fact that T 00 0, and the last inequality is due to the fact that T 0 (z) x (T (0) + T (z)) is a non-decreasing function of x for x < 0. Similarly T 0 (c) x (T i + T j ) 0 for x < 0. Hence both are decreasing for x > 0 if the utility belongs to IARA, ensures that the sorting pattern will be negative assortative. 
